Introduction
In the face of rapidly increasing rice prices, the Lao government imposed a rice export ban in November 2010. Even though the price of the staple food in one of the world's poorest countries had risen by over 50 percent, and the ban only lasted until February 2011, it was criticized by economists and multilateral organizations. The IMF (2011 p. 18) , for instance, asserted that "discretionary measures that seek to isolate domestic markets from international price developments may not be effective and are not advisable." Representatives of the Lao government disagreed, 4 responding that "the measure was made necessary to address a speculatively fuelled price increase and excessive foreign demand pressures in September 2010, which endangered the domestic rice stock."
Rapidly rising or very high staple food prices constitute a great challenge in many less-developed countries: they directly affect the poor, who often spend more than half of their income on food, and they raise the risk for food riots and political unrest (Barrett and Bellemare, 2011; Bellemare, 2011; Bellemare, et al., 2013) . Rice trade policy is generally not guided by economic principles alone, as any decisions tend to be highly politicized (see e.g. Timmer, 1975; David and Huang, 1996) . In Lao PDR, glutinous rice 5 consumption constitutes almost 70 percent of the calorie and protein intake, which makes access to affordable glutinous rice of crucial importance to the welfare status of the poor (FAO, 3 2001; EMC, 2011; Bouahom and Douangsavanh, 2013) . While many rice farmers in Lao PDR would potentially benefit from higher prices, the fact is that only a quarter of the households sell rice and over a third buys it (Hill and Christiansen, 2006; Lao Census, 2012; World Bank, 2015) . 6 It is thus understandable that many less-developed countries, including Lao PDR, resort to extensive trade restrictions with the aim of ensuring stable staple food prices (Galtier, 2013) . And, in fact, appropriate trade restrictions may also agree with optimal trade and storage models, see e.g. Gouel and Jean (2014) and .
Nonetheless, it is commonly believed that government policy interventions encountered in practice are more likely to generate price spikes than to curb them.
Interventions are frequently of a discretionary nature, creating an environment of uncertainty that hampers private market development and ultimately increases prices; see for example the recent studies of maize markets in Sub-Saharan Africa by Chapoto and Jayne (2009) , Jayne and Tschirley (2010) and Tschirley and Jayne (2010) . But even transparent and rule-based trade restrictions may lead to price spikes as rational agents anticipate the lifting of these restrictions (Porteous, 2012) . The same trade restrictions, if collectively enforced by a sufficiently large share of the market, have also been linked to price spikes on the world market (see e.g. Anderson and Nelgen, 2012; Barrett and Bellemare, 2011; Martin and Anderson, 2012; Ivanic and Martin, 2014a) . 7 Yet, not all government interventions are bad. There are examples where government interventions 6 It should be noted that in 2012 about a third of the households that are net-buyers of rice spend less than 10% of their food expenditures on purchasing rice (World Bank, 2015 Many of the documented price spikes in the literature have been attributed to the discretionary introduction of export bans Tschirley and Jayne, 2010; Ivanic and Martin, 2014a Though not addressed in this paper, it is advisable to take into account the likely distribution of benefits and costs when designing the policy, and consider options for appropriately targeted measures to cushion negative impacts on the poor and vulnerable.
Ideally, the measures would also take into account the special needs of upland areas where food insecurity is problematic even in the absence of price increases.
Section 2 describes the data and outlines the key issues in the discussion about food policy and international trade. Section 3 carries out the cointegration analysis, estimates error correction models and implements innovation accounting, while Section 4 analyzes the role of exports and harvests. Section 5 briefly discusses policy implications. Section 6 concludes the paper.
The price data
This section describes the price data and highlights price differences and long-run relationships between the price series. We have compiled a database of monthly prices for all three countries (Lao PDR, Thailand and Vietnam) for the period January 2001 to December 2012. All prices have been converted to US dollar per kilogram.
The Lao price denotes the average consumer price for first quality glutinous rice.
Since the Lao rice market is not perfectly integrated, it should be noted that our price series is more representative for Central and Southern regions than the Northern region where prices are usually lower. Less than 20% of the rice is cultivated in the Northern provinces and most of it is for self-consumption. The Thai and Vietnamese prices are also consumer prices. The Thai series is from the Northeast of Thailand, where glutinous rice is the staple food. For Vietnam our price data are at the province level. We use these data to compute a an index based on the average of the consumer prices for the provinces from the Northern region of Vietnam, the region with the closest ties to Lao PDR, by appealing to principal component analysis. Prices in 2010 correspond to those in Hanoi, the by far largest city.
Other measures were also explored but provided similar results. The data appendix provides detailed information about the price series used. Table   1 provides some additional information on volatility by reporting standard deviations for first and twelfth log differences and measures of deviation from the normal distribution (skewness and kurtosis). This confirms that Vietnamese prices are the most stable. Figure 3. Prices in growth rates (log first differences)
Co-integration analysis and innovation accounting
In this section we first use cointegration analysis to test for potential long-run (equilibrium) relationships between the price series, and then apply impulse response analysis and variance decomposition to shed light on the relative importance of Lao, Thai and Vietnamese price shocks for the evolution of rice prices in Lao PDR.
The Johansen procedure 9 is used to test for cointegrating vectors, since it allows for multiple cointegrating vectors and short run dynamics. The trace test statistics, reported in 13 Table 3 reports long-run and adjustment coefficients, along with their significance, and test statistics for the exclusion of individual variables from the cointegrating vector.
The coefficients of the cointegrating vector, i.e., the long-run coefficients, are 0.84 for Vietnamese rice prices and 0.20 for Thai prices, indicating a dominant role for Vietnamese prices. Fig. 4 (middle and lower panel) reports the recursive estimates of long-run coefficients along with 95% confidence intervals. They are a bit volatile in the beginning of the sample, arguably due to the small number of observations, but are overall quite stable.
The cointegrating vector, P Lao PDR -0.84 P Vietnam -0.20 P Thailand , is depicted in Fig. 5 , and it is clearly stationary.
The exclusion tests show that all three series are needed to establish cointegration (Table 3) . This implies that all three variables have a unit root, since we otherwise would have found a stationary vector made up of two variables only. Augmented Dickey Fuller tests, reported in the appendix, and visual inspection of the variables ( Fig. 2 and 3 ), provide additional support for this conclusion. One possibility is that the 2010 price increase was due to a bad Vietnamese, or regional, harvest in 2010, as is claimed by FAO (2011). This conclusion does not seem to be supported by the data on the (de-trended) harvests in Lao PDR and Vietnam, which suggest that both harvests stayed close to the trend (Fig. 10) . While we have few data
points, it appears that the size of the harvests in Lao PDR impacts on the exports to
Vietnam; large harvests have been found to increase subsequent exports (Fig. 11) .
The conclusions drawn from the visual inspection of the graphs are corroborated by re-estimating the error correction model for Lao PDR (from Section 3), with exports (lagged six months) and harvest size (lagged two and eight months) added as independent variables. The choice of lags was based on the graphs. Good harvests are expected to reduce prices as supply increases in the short-run, but may then also increase prices later in the year as rice stocks start running out prior to the next harvest.
Column 1 in Table 4 , confirms that exports have a highly significant effect on prices (t-value = 3.9). A one standard deviation (1.409 million kg) increase in exports is associated with roughly a 25 percent annualized inflation rate (0.015*1.409*12=0.254).
This should be considered as a rough indication, however, given that the export variable is heavily skewed with many observations close to zero. Column 2 reports the same regression with only harvests added, using data for 2001:9-2012:12. The second lag is negative as expected, though the p-value is 0.15, while the eighth lag is positive and significant. Thus, the larger the harvest, the larger the price increase at the end of the year, 22 before the next harvest. The third column includes both harvests and exports, though exports are a mediator for harvests. While controlling for exports slightly reduces the coefficients for the harvest variables (and vice versa), the positive effect of harvest size at the longer lag continues to be significant. One interpretation is that the lagged harvest size acts as a proxy for informal exports which are expected to have a positive effect on prices. 
25

Policy Implications
Our data analysis highlights three key issues: (1) a long-run dependence of Lao PDR rice prices on regional prices, (2) Lao PDR's low relative price level, and (3) the emergence of price spikes following periods of large exports. In this section we will briefly discuss the policy implications of these findings for Lao PDR.
Although there is a lack of detailed information about policies and market regulation, and how they have changed over time, the overall picture is reasonably clear.
Since the launch of the market reform program in 1986, the New Economic Mechanism, the Lao government has implemented a range of policies to boost rice production and manage supply and prices (Bourdet, 2000) . One aim was self-sufficiency at the national level, which was achieved in 1999/2000 according to the government.
Policies used to control the rice market include an import duty of 5% on paddy rice and an elaborate system of export and import permits (WFP, 2014; LAO Trade Portal, 2014 ). In addition, traders need authorization from provincial authorities, who collect customs levies at international border crossings that partly accrue to the provinces. On top of this, informal payments are reportedly required to move food across provincial and national borders (WFP, 2014) . Moreover, the government owns a company, State Food Enterprise, which is a major actor in the rice market. It buys rice during harvests for government staff and sells rice stocks during periods of shortage to the general population, and is assumed to influence market prices (Tobias et al., 2012) .
Another important factor is that domestic transport costs are high due to mountainous terrain and underdeveloped infrastructure, which sometimes make it 26 unprofitable to move rice from surplus to deficit provinces. As a result, surpluses in the lowland along the Mekong River might instead be exported to Thailand and Vietnam, even though there are deficits in the north. Also, in some provinces it is cheaper to import rice from abroad than from other provinces in Lao PDR (WFP, 2014) .
In spite of these controls and structural obstacles, prices in Lao PDR follow those in
Thailand and Vietnam well, as the cointegration analysis shows. 12 There are periods of a couple of years where Lao prices deviate substantially, but they eventually return to the long-run (equilibrium) path. We do not know if there is a long-run interdependence because the authorities occasionally allow for exports, or because of informal trade, or both.
The current policy of export restrictions is at least in part responsible for keeping prices relatively low in Lao PDR. We have also traced the price spikes back to the discretionary policy interventions of the government, as domestic prices are found to increase in periods where restrictions are relaxed. The 2010 price spike illustrates the dynamics well: In 2009 the harvest was unusually bountiful, so constraints on official exports were relaxed, which subsequently led to large exports. Rice prices rose slowly during the first quarter of 2010, and then rapidly until the 2010 harvest started in October.
This story contrasts with FAO (2011), according to which prices rose to unusually high levels due to fears of low production in 2010, both nationally and regionally. The government may not have been able to adequately track the volume of trade over time relative to the size of the harvest, which ultimately led to overly optimistic exports and 27 domestic shortages. 13 There is a paucity of information on unofficial exports to Vietnam, but they probably also increased; Anh and Nghiep (2012) estimate informal exports to
Vietnam to be about 10% of official exports.
Against this background the lifting of trade restrictions, as is for example suggested by Eliste and Santos (2012) , is arguably the first-best policy recommendation. The expectation is that this would permanently raise the domestic price of rice by substantially reducing the price gap with Vietnam and Thailand. This has the potential to significantly increase incomes from agriculture in Lao PDR. There is also a good chance that it will stimulate modernization of the agricultural sector, i.e. improve the quality of rice mills and marketing system (Lao Development Report; World Bank, forthcoming). In addition, liberalization of trade will eliminate policy-induced price spikes; as overall exports will be elevated to a new higher equilibrium level, it will plausibly limit the price impact of potential over-exporting in response to good harvests. What shape or form price spikes will assume in a free-trade world remains to be seen, but Vietnamese rice prices were relatively stable during the last decade.
While a policy of liberalization would appear to offer many benefits, it is important to remain alert to the distributional implications of such a free-trade policy. 14 It is conceivable that there will be both winners and losers from trade liberalization, at least in 13 Jayne and Tschirley (2010) make a similar observation on the maize market in Malawi, where in 2008-2009 a good harvest gave rise to a sharp increase in the price of maize not long thereafter. It appears that in Malawi it was government control that dictated the exports (based on its own estimates of the harvest), where in Lao PDR the exports accumulated as the government relaxed control of the cross-border trade.
14 Until recently, the staple food price discussion was about whether governments should attempt to reduce food price volatility or abstain from market interventions (Dawe 2001; HLPE, 2011; Dawe and Timmer, 2012) . However, the key challenge is arguably how poor countries should prevent large price spikes, since these are of a direct concern to the welfare of the poor, and have the potential to trigger political unrest (Barret and Bellemare, 2011; Jayne, 2011; Bellemare et al., 2013) .
the short-term (Ravallion, 1990; Barrett and Dorosh, 1996; Ravallion, 2006 , Mghenyi et al., 2011 Headey, 2013) . The winners will include large land owners who are net producers while the losers will arguably include small land owners who are net consumers. However, in Lao PDR as many as 27% of households sold some rice produce in 2010/11 according to the 2012 Lao Agricultural Census. 15 In fact, only about 34% of the Lao households are net rice buyers, and close to a third of them spend less than 10% of their food budget on market rice purchases. It is estimated that only 26% of the poor are net-buyers compared to about 36% of the non-poor (World Bank, 2015) .
In the medium to long term, many of the poor will ultimately also be better off as the benefits from the expansion of the agricultural sector will eventually trickle down.
These benefits will likely be in the form of higher rural wages and an increase in demand for farm workers, see for example the study by Jacoby (2013) The benefits of the indirect effect, which constitutes a primary channel through which the poor net-consumers of rice will be compensated for the higher cost of living, may 15 As a percentage of farm households it is estimated that 71% sold some rice produce in 2010/11, up from 35% in 1998/99, which suggests that we are seeing a shift toward market-oriented agriculture (Lao Census, 2012 Mokomane, 2012; and Alderman and Haque, 2006) . The report recommends that social protection programs be combined with efforts to strengthen the rice sector and with investments in infrastructure.
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These and other good practice lessons can inform the government's investments into its social protection programs that could help mitigate some of the negative impacts of higher rice prices. The advantage that the government has in this case is that it can decide when to open the borders to free trade, and can hence announce its plan well ahead of time, so that both the public and the private sector can prepare for the transition.
Conclusion
Glutinous rice is the staple food in Lao PDR and as such it is important for the welfare of many Laotians. As in numerous other less-developed countries, the Lao government monitors the staple food market closely and regularly intervenes to ensure 16 Access to highly disaggregated estimates of poverty (and other socio-economic indicators) such as poverty maps may help to improve the cost-efficiency of targeting the poor (see e.g. Elbers et al., 2007) .
17 Such investments would also help lower the transactions costs involved in moving rice from surplus to deficit areas.
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availability of rice and stable prices. Nonetheless, real glutinous rice prices rose by close to 50% over a couple of months in 2010. The government responded by implementing an export ban, blaming farmers and millers for causing the price spike through speculation (Lao PDR, 2010) . Since rapidly rising staple food prices directly affects the poor, who often spend more than half of their income on food, and may lead to political unrest, the government's reaction is not surprising.
The general view in academic and political circles is that government interventions are more often than not a contributing factor rather than a solution to price spikes, and hence a standard recommendation is to remove trade barriers all together (Anderson and Nelgen, 2012; Barrett and Bellemare, 2011; Eliste and Santos, 2012) . The effectiveness of government interventions however is largely context-specific. Recent studies on several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa provide evidence that interventions in the maize markets have led to large price increases (see e.g. Chapoto and Jayne, 2009; Jayne and Tschirley, 2010; Porteous, 2012) . And export and import restrictions that are associated with so-called beggar thy neighbor polices have been held responsible, at least in part, for the sharp food price increases during recent crises (Martin and Anderson, 2012; Jensen and Anderson, 2014) . But there are also success stories. For example, it is commonly agreed that some Asian governments have successfully managed their rice prices (see e.g. Cummings, 2012; and Dawe and Timmer, 2012) . To be able to evaluate current policy against alternatives one first needs to obtain a clear understanding of how food prices are determined in the country of interest.
We use cointegration analysis for the period January 2001 -December 2012 to test for long-run relationships between Lao, Thai and Vietnamese glutinous rice prices.
Thailand and Vietnam both have long borders with Lao PDR and are major rice producers and consumers. In a second step we use innovation accounting (impulse responses and variance decomposition) to evaluate the importance of domestic versus Thai and
Vietnamese price shocks to Lao rice prices. Finally, the impact of exports and harvests on Lao prices are analyzed.
Our main findings are three-fold: First, cointegration analysis and innovation accounting show that Lao PDR is importing rice price changes in the long run by exporting its produce to Vietnam and Thailand, in spite of an elaborate set of controls on international trade. Second, the error correction models with exports and harvests added as independent variables reveal a pattern where good harvests are followed by large (official) exports, which later during the year lead to significant prices increases, most likely since stocks are depleted ahead of the next harvest. Third, rice prices in Lao PDR are considerably lower than in Thailand and Vietnam, despite the evidence of market integration.
The Lao government wishes to prevent temporary price spurts while maintaining affordable rice prices by controlling exports, which has been identified as a key channel for transmitting price increases. This probably applies equally to other developing countries that export their staple food, and where a large part of the population is dependent on a staple food. This policy dilemma is not always fully appreciated by free-trade proponents.
The dilemma does not bar removal of trade barriers from being part of a recommended policy package. Trade liberalization would plausibly curb policy-induced price spikes and almost certainly raise the long-term price of rice, and thereby hopefully create the conditions for an expansion and modernization of the agricultural sector. If indeed, these developments will ultimately help to reduce poverty, as we have seen in 32 Cambodia (World Bank, 2013) . It does mean, however, that such a reform is ideally combined with a careful assessment of the distributional implications, specifically how it would impact on poor net buyers of rice (Ravallion, 1990; Hertel et al., 2004; Ivanic and Martin, 2008; Ivanic at al., 2012) .
Whatever the Lao government decides, the transition to free-trade will undoubtedly be helped if the reform package is transparent and announced well ahead of time so that both the public and private sector can prepare for it.
